Subject:
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Re: Don Quixote puts away his lance (was Re: McDonalds set
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Wed, 29 Sep 1999 16:18:24 GMT
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Viewed:
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1449 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, James Brown writes:
> In lugnet.off-topic.debate, David Eaton writes:
> > Well, to the absolutest of my theory, yes. I have no grounds for assuming
>
> Doesn't have to be taken to an extreme. If I happen to see a total stranger
> kill someone, I know what has happened, but not why.
And that's really why I feel the need to judge by intent. If I see one person
kill another, I can see the action, but not the intent. Perhaps the killer had
no idea he was killing, or whatever. His intent could concievably be such that
his action was not immoral. And for the most part, if I watch the method of the
killing, I can be able to guess at the killer's motivation. But I might easily
be wrong. And the more I know about the situation, the more confident I am in
my guess.
> Sorry, being unclear in the interests of brevity(1). You were saying
> (paraphrase warning!) that you felt that a mentally ill person's actions would
> be immoral even if they were unaware of the 'wrongness' of it. That implies
> that morality is external.
> ...
> 1:Too late. It's like trying to make a long story short.
Ahh... Not really... more like they were aware that they violated their own
'true' morality. When the subconscious is revealed, they feel deep remorse,
because they know that the subconscious morality was there all along, and that
they violated it. That's rather different from being ignorant of morality,
since being ignorant means that that area of your morality hasn't been defined
yet. The subconscious morality was already there, just repressed or ignored or
something.
> Laws can't be immoral. They aren't self-aware.(2) Therefore they can't
> define a moral code for themselves. The child is only immoral if the child's
> moral code decides playing with the frog is immoral.(3) (for example, if the
> child's morality includes 'thou shalt not incur punishment')
> ...
> 2:At least, not as we define it. ;-)
> 3:Hmm. How often can 'moral*' appear in the same sentence without it sounding
> pretentious?
Well, I think that laws can be immoral, but they are not 'required' to be so.
If there was a law that "Everyday you must kill someone and destroy someone's
property", that law would force me to go against my own morality. If I followed
it, I wouldn't be moral. My alternatives are to either leave the society, or to
be punished for my unlawful inaction. I think the objective of law making
should be to make laws as moral as possible. Is it ultimately possible?
Probably not. Concievable? I suppose so; but probably not.
> I can find fault with that. To say that God defines morality makes it
> external.
> ...
> Same problem. If logic defines morality, it's external again.
I have the same problem, but it's not really a very arguable problem. If
someone says "God defines morality, you have no say in it", I can't really
argue against them. I can say I disagree, but I can't try and prove my point to
them in any way other than by example. I'd try and push the extremes of
hypothetical examples to see if they really wanted to believe what they say.
But I can't show logical problems with their theory. Hence, I wouldn't call it
a 'fault', so much as a problem-- but only a problem for me. A fault seems to
imply that if they knew their fault, and were shown how to correct it, they
would change their opinions on morality; and I don't really think that they
would (or that *everyone* would, suffice to say).
> Nope, it's relevant to individuals too, but it is *defined* by society. That
> is the quintisential difference between a moral code, and a ethical code.
Ahh... ok... that's not really how I envision "ethics" as a term, but I'll
accept it.
> Ok, here is where I think we've got a big miscommunication. When ever you
> talk about judging morally, that reads (to me) as "apply my morality to"
Hmm... Interesting point. Actually, in my last post, I think I made a drastic
error somewhere in the middle on this subject... I think it's been snipped... I
realized I had said quite the wrong thing about an hour after I wrote it, but
alas...
Anyway, "morality" is tough. We all have different ideas about what is moral
and what isn't moral, but we all have the same "definition" of morality. Hence,
when you suggest that something is "moral" or "immoral", I know what you mean
by saying "moral" and agree with that definition, but I might not agree with
the conclusion of saying the object/action being compared to being moral or
immoral. Suffice to say, we all know what 'good' means, but we disagree with
each other's definitions. Hmm... that's really hard to say it nicely, but
hopefully that gets the basic point across on this issue.
When I say I judge someone else morally, I don't judge them according to my own
definition of morality, but by my rules for the definition of morality. Hence,
my rules dictate that intent governs morality, so I try and devise the other
person's intent and morality and apply it to them. Does it work? For the most
part, I'd say it does. Humans typically have pretty consistent ideas on
morality. But there are always problems. And as you get to the more specific,
more and more problems arise. It's certainly not a full-proof method, neither
is it capable of being so; but it's my only way to judge other people's
morality.
Why bother judging people's morality? I have no idea. I think that's another
thing that's instinctual. I think people want to know whether other people and
their actions are good or bad. And I think that judging other people's moral
standing also helps to dictate our own actions. If I judge someone to be moral,
even though they have gone against my own morality, I will be less harsh to
them than if I think they've violated their own morality. Basically, if you
feel the person is being moral, you're more approving, if you think the person
is being immoral, you're less approving, despite their particular action. And
that is why I have a problem with judging by action. I don't feel that I
should invoke my own morality of action on them without knowing their own
morality.
> I wasn't meaning to address whether the child was moral or not. It doesn't
> matter in the least whether or not the child thinks hair-pulling is right or
> wrong, or a god-given power.
>
> I was stating that it would be moral (under my code) for ME to punish the
> child for wrong-doing so long as the child knew (either directly or
> implicitely) that I would consider it wrong-doing, and knew that wrong-doing
> is punishable.
Yep... my only quarrel with this is as before: Gauranteeing that the child is
capable of directly or implicitly knowing your reaction. If you think the child
should know, ("You should know better than that!", etc.), but he doesn't, are
you still moral in punishing him? It sounds vaguely like my own problem-- you
have to know something internal to him-- i.e. his capacity for inference and
his direct knowledge and interpretation. The only way I can see of
*guaranteeing* that your action is moral is if you have given him direct
knowledge and definition of everything. In other words, you'd need to have it
infinitely covered.
Laterz,
DaveE
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