Subject:
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Re: Don Quixote puts away his lance (was Re: McDonalds set
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Tue, 28 Sep 1999 20:54:13 GMT
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1233 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, James Brown writes:
> > Yep. What it really means is I can't judge you. Only you can judge you. I can
> > do my darndest to try, and usually, in our society, we can do a pretty good
> > job of determining someone else's intent. We don't always get the details
> > right, and sometimes we screw up majorly, but for the most part, we can tell.
> > But you can never be sure.
>
> Determining intent can only be inferential, not observational. This makes
> judging by intent inherently less impartial than judging by actions.
Well, to the absolutest of my theory, yes. I have no grounds for assuming
anyone else's intent, and have no basis for proof. But the point is that it
usually does seem to work. That is, usually, I can judge someone's intent
fairly well. But that judge of intent is very sketchy. People I know, for
instance, are easier than others, assuming that they aren't trying to decieve
me for some reason. And just to say it, it is nearly completely observational.
In order to judge someone's intent, you have to observe their attitude,
behavior, history, actions past and present, etc., etc. The more you know about
a person, the easier it becomes to guess at their intent. Will you be right?
According to the absolute extreme of the theory, no. Only by coincidence. But
in practice, I find that I can be fairly accurate, at least to my own
satisfaction. However, as to your claim, yes, judging by action is a lot more
impartial. The problem _I_ have with that is that I don't judge morality on the
basis of action as much as intent. Hence, I must be content to be unsure of
people's real intent; and so far, I have been.
> I do not trust myself to judge anyone's intent.(1) I am not omniscient, and I
> will never know why someone does something. I can infer, but I cannot
> observe.
> ...
> 1:Even my own, on some occasions ;-)
I trust myself to read intent to some extent. Do I trust it to the point of
thinking I'm omniscient? Not nearly.
> Your argument almost sounds like you are claiming morality is
> external, which is another place I disagree (with most of society). I think
> that morality can only be determined internally, not dictated from outside. A
> code of behavior determined externally is an ethical code, not a moral code.
Ummm... No. Hmm... I'm not really sure where you got that from my post... I'd
say morality is entirely internal. Society has its own laws which are
externally defined, but morality is determined by you. Hmmm... I know I said
somewhere something like 'if your intent is to do good, you're good' which
maybe implies the 2nd good is external. The 2nd good actually more of what I
would judge you to be, while the 1st 'good' referrs to the person's own
judgement. Hence, if you defy what you hold to be morality, I hold that you're
immoral.
> I disagree. <grin> In my opinion, if it is wrong to kill, then it is wrong to
> kill, period. Otherwise, there's no such thing as a moral dillema. What if
> someone honestly and truly is unaware they did wrong. In your view, they are
> moral. After the fact, they are taught that what they did is wrong. Do they
> suddenly become immoral?
Do they *become* immoral? No. But they will probably feel remorse for their
action. Does that remorse vindicate it? Not at all. Actually, I shouldn't even
bother mentioning the remorse... I think a perfectly moral person could not
feel remorse and be none the worse for it. The problem I have with the it's
wrong to kill no matter what idea is that I can't bring myself to judge those
who are ignorant. If a baby pulls the trigger to a gun, and kills his
grandmother, is the baby evil? Was the baby wrong to kill the grandmother? I'd
classify it as an unfortunate accident, but I wouldn't call it an immoral act.
> Yup, complete agreement. I don't think a moral code should be applied to
> society at all. Only you can decide if you are acting morally or not.
At least we agree on something! :)
> Well then, society thinks that playing with his stuffed frog is grounds for
> death, and if he wants to not die, he'd better not get caught playing with his
> stuffed frog, or leave the society. This has >nothing< to do with morality,
> but with ethics.
Ethics vs. Morality? Hmm... I generally think of them as one and the same...
But it sounds like you're comparing ethics to a social code? If so, yep. The
question to you is, is the baby immoral for playing with the stuffed frog,
since (presumably) the law is immoral? But I think that's a mute point. I don't
think you'd hold the child to be immoral.
> > really my quarrel. We can turn it around, and say what if a person who
> > honestly believed killing was right was in the situation. How COULD he know
> > or be able to find out he was wrong? Obviously (I think), society doesn't
> > determine morality. And without having some flawless divine connection, there
> > is no real way that I can see to connect the person with an absolute
> > morality. John D tried arguing for logic to be that connection in the last
> > debate, but I have problems with that, too. The point is that we all agree
> > that other people don't have a say in morality (ex: Bob saying I'm evil
> > doesn't make me evil), so how should we determine morality? Either it's
>
> But up above, in the terrorist example you said you trusted your own
> judgement. How does that jive with not having a say in morality?
Hmm... I'm not really sure what you mean... Perhaps I was writing unclearly as
well... What I was trying to do here was to locate and analyze other
possibilities, other than my own. One way (that I can't find fault with) is to
say that God determines morality, and we don't get a say in it. "What's right
is what God says is right." Another way (that John D was trying, I think) was
to say that persuit of flawless logic will lead us to an ultimate knowledge of
a flawless, universal morality. But my problem with that is experiential.
People's logic differs from person to person. To suggest a 'perfect' logic
seems to be to suggest something similar to a 'perfect' religion. Bob's logic
is right or Bob's logic is wrong. *Someone* *somewhere* has to have a 'perfect'
knowledge of logic, and the only real choice for that would be God. I tend to
think, however, that logic is defined by the person; and that humans tend to be
very close in their definitions of logic. Another possibility is that a
universal morality is externally defined somewhere else, but I can't imagine
where.... The only other possibility that I see left is that morality is
variant. My morality can be different from your morality. What is moral changes
from person to person. How can that morality be defined? I'd say either through
society or through the individual (as in those are the only options.. maybe
there are others). And we know my feelings on society defining morality
already. But I guess maybe I could accept an argument on societal based
morality... I just wouldn't agree with it. The only choice left that I can see
is the one that I choose. Morality is defined by the individual. The problem is
that then morality is no longer universal because you entrust the definition of
morality to the person. People may not all believe that killing is wrong, etc.
> When I can reach an ultimate morality, I will be omniscient.
Yep... that was one of my problems with the ultimate/universal morality thing.
I can't imagine omniscience. And saying something like "killing is wrong NO
MATTER WHAT" seems rather omniscient to me. I feel like saying "prove it!" But
then we'd need a definition of 'wrong', and there we fail...
> That's an assumption. Neither you nor I have any way of knowing the child
> feels bad about it, or will ever feel bad about it.
Yep. Again, I trust my judgment for the most part about judging intent. Of
course, it's hard to do in the theoretical example, because we each enter into
an example with potentially different assumptions, and there isn't a verifiable
answer. But I find that in practice, it's generally a safe assumption.
> Also, "realizes...action was immoral" implies that the morality is external to
> the child. I hold that the child cannot realize that an action is immoral,
> the child has to >decide< an action is moral. In other words, I believe that
> a moral code is learned, where as you imply that you think it is instinctive.
Well, to a certain extent, yes to both. I don't want to re-post the huge post I
made before, but I think that morality is at least in part instinctive. One of
the initial bases of morality (I hold) is the want for others to be happy. I
think that this base is grounded in instinct. As far as the realization vs.
decision, (experiential vs. instinctive?) I think that it's both. As the child
experiences more, it learns what hurts and helps it, and makes the connection
with the instinctive want for others' well-being, and it tuns into a more
expanded morality. Hence, what ensues is an understanding for what actions
work towards good and which toward bad.
> All of these are determined by me, in the case of morality, and by groups in
> the case of legality or ethics.
> And it is important to note that I never claimed to hold that there are any
> ultimate rules regarding behavior. I just hold that a moral code based on
> behavior is more consistent than a moral code based on intent.
Again, Morals vs. Ethics... "legality or ethics"... It does sound rather like
you're suggesting an ethical code is only relavant to a society. Maybe not...
hmm... As for the ultimate rule claim, maybe you were just playing devil's
advocate, but it sounded before like you were saying "killing is wrong" was
a universal moral.
> Ignorance of the law was a poor way of phrasing it, my apologies. If the
> child is ignorant of any wrong, then of course punishment would be wrong(2).
> But I would be inclined to say that in most cases, most children would be
> aware that hair-pulling is painful, and they are likely doing it on purpose,
> with an awareness that it is considered wrong. This is where the 'ignorance
> of the law' part comes in. Despite the fact that they haven't been told
> 'don't pull hair' they are aware (through inference and environment) that it
> is 'wrong'. But again, this whole example has nothing to do with morality,
> and everything to do with ethics.
> ...
> 2:This is, of course, my own morality.
So the action is still wrong, but not the act of punishment... ok, I'll buy
that. But as for the child being "aware (through inference and environment)
that it is 'wrong'"... I'd say that qualifies the action as judgable morally,
and moreover, judgable to be immoral. But why? Is it moral because the child
knows what he's doing (as in knows he's pulling hair)? Or is it immoral because
the child knows that pulling hair causes pain to his sister, and does it
anyway? The former implies also that the child would have knowledge of
association of the hair pulling with 'wrong', and this is what makes it
wrong... that he 'knows' its wrong. I'd of course say the latter. He's only
immoral because he knows perfectly well that he's hurting his sister, and his
intent (presumably) is to hurt her (either through annoyance or physical pain).
If he avoids doing it only because he knows that it's 'wrong', well, I don't
really think that's *good* of him, mostly because that implies that he's taken
the definition of 'wrong' on faith-- a faith external to himself. 'Wrong'
wasn't defined by him, he's just abiding by it.
Laterz,
DaveE
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