Subject:
|
Re: Don Quixote puts away his lance (was Re: McDonalds set
|
Newsgroups:
|
lugnet.off-topic.debate
|
Date:
|
Tue, 28 Sep 1999 21:51:05 GMT
|
Viewed:
|
1307 times
|
| |
|
|
In lugnet.off-topic.debate, David Eaton writes:
> > Determining intent can only be inferential, not observational. This makes
> > judging by intent inherently less impartial than judging by actions.
>
> Well, to the absolutest of my theory, yes. I have no grounds for assuming
Doesn't have to be taken to an extreme. If I happen to see a total stranger
kill someone, I know what has happened, but not why.
> > Your argument almost sounds like you are claiming morality is
> > external, which is another place I disagree (with most of society). I think
> > that morality can only be determined internally, not dictated from outside.
> > A code of behavior determined externally is an ethical code, not a moral
> > code.
>
> Ummm... No. Hmm... I'm not really sure where you got that from my post... I'd
Sorry, being unclear in the interests of brevity(1). You were saying
(paraphrase warning!) that you felt that a mentally ill person's actions would
be immoral even if they were unaware of the 'wrongness' of it. That implies
that morality is external.
> > I disagree. <grin> In my opinion, if it is wrong to kill, then it is wrong
> > to kill, period. Otherwise, there's no such thing as a moral dillema. What
> > if someone honestly and truly is unaware they did wrong. In your view, they • are moral. After the fact, they are taught that what they did is wrong. Do
> > they suddenly become immoral?
>
> Do they *become* immoral? No. But they will probably feel remorse for their
> action. Does that remorse vindicate it? Not at all. Actually, I shouldn't even
> bother mentioning the remorse... I think a perfectly moral person could not
> feel remorse and be none the worse for it. The problem I have with the it's
> wrong to kill no matter what idea is that I can't bring myself to judge those
> who are ignorant.
Ok, I think I'm seeing a basic mis-communication going on. More on that
later...
> > Well then, society thinks that playing with his stuffed frog is grounds for
> > death, and if he wants to not die, he'd better not get caught playing with
> > his stuffed frog, or leave the society. This has >nothing< to do with
> > morality, but with ethics.
>
> Ethics vs. Morality? Hmm... I generally think of them as one and the same...
> But it sounds like you're comparing ethics to a social code? If so, yep. The
> question to you is, is the baby immoral for playing with the stuffed frog,
> since (presumably) the law is immoral? But I think that's a mute point. I
> don't think you'd hold the child to be immoral.
Laws can't be immoral. They aren't self-aware.(2) Therefore they can't
define a moral code for themselves. The child is only immoral if the child's
moral code decides playing with the frog is immoral.(3) (for example, if the
child's morality includes 'thou shalt not incur punishment')
> > But up above, in the terrorist example you said you trusted your own
> > judgement. How does that jive with not having a say in morality?
>
> Hmm... I'm not really sure what you mean... Perhaps I was writing unclearly as
> well... What I was trying to do here was to locate and analyze other
> possibilities, other than my own. One way (that I can't find fault with) is to
> say that God determines morality, and we don't get a say in it. "What's right
I can find fault with that. To say that God defines morality makes it
external.
> is what God says is right." Another way (that John D was trying, I think) was
> to say that persuit of flawless logic will lead us to an ultimate knowledge of
> a flawless, universal morality. But my problem with that is experiential.
Same problem. If logic defines morality, it's external again.
> Again, Morals vs. Ethics... "legality or ethics"... It does sound rather like
> you're suggesting an ethical code is only relavant to a society. Maybe not...
Nope, it's relevant to individuals too, but it is *defined* by society. That
is the quintisential difference between a moral code, and a ethical code.
> hmm... As for the ultimate rule claim, maybe you were just playing devil's
> advocate, but it sounded before like you were saying "killing is wrong" was
> a universal moral.
Whoops! Nope. I was provided it as an example of a action-defined moral.
There are no universal morals. I should rather have said "I shalt not kill".
> > Ignorance of the law was a poor way of phrasing it, my apologies. If the
> > child is ignorant of any wrong, then of course punishment would be wrong(2).
> > But I would be inclined to say that in most cases, most children would be
> > aware that hair-pulling is painful, and they are likely doing it on purpose,
> > with an awareness that it is considered wrong. This is where the 'ignorance
> > of the law' part comes in. Despite the fact that they haven't been told
> > 'don't pull hair' they are aware (through inference and environment) that it
> > is 'wrong'. But again, this whole example has nothing to do with morality,
> > and everything to do with ethics.
> > ...
> > 2:This is, of course, my own morality.
>
> So the action is still wrong, but not the act of punishment... ok, I'll buy
> that. But as for the child being "aware (through inference and environment)
> that it is 'wrong'"... I'd say that qualifies the action as judgable morally,
> and moreover, judgable to be immoral. But why? Is it moral because the child
Ok, here is where I think we've got a big miscommunication. When ever you
talk about judging morally, that reads (to me) as "apply my morality to"
> knows what he's doing (as in knows he's pulling hair)? Or is it immoral
> because the child knows that pulling hair causes pain to his sister, and does
> it anyway? The former implies also that the child would have knowledge of
> association of the hair pulling with 'wrong', and this is what makes it
> wrong... that he 'knows' its wrong. I'd of course say the latter. He's only
> immoral because he knows perfectly well that he's hurting his sister, and his
> intent (presumably) is to hurt her (either through annoyance or physical
> pain). If he avoids doing it only because he knows that it's 'wrong', well, I
> don't really think that's *good* of him, mostly because that implies that
> he's taken the definition of 'wrong' on faith-- a faith external to himself.
> 'Wrong' wasn't defined by him, he's just abiding by it.
I wasn't meaning to address whether the child was moral or not. It doesn't
matter in the least whether or not the child thinks hair-pulling is right or
wrong, or a god-given power.
I was stating that it would be moral (under my code) for ME to punish the
child for wrong-doing so long as the child knew (either directly or
implicitely) that I would consider it wrong-doing, and knew that wrong-doing
is punishable.
1:Too late. It's like trying to make a long story short.
2:At least, not as we define it. ;-)
3:Hmm. How often can 'moral*' appear in the same sentence without it sounding
pretentious?
James
http://www.shades-of-night.com/lego/
|
|
Message has 2 Replies:
Message is in Reply To:
81 Messages in This Thread:
  
 
- Entire Thread on One Page:
- Nested:
All | Brief | Compact | Dots
Linear:
All | Brief | Compact
This Message and its Replies on One Page:
- Nested:
All | Brief | Compact | Dots
Linear:
All | Brief | Compact
|
|
|
|
