Subject:
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Re: My Concession (for John mostly)
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Tue, 1 Apr 2003 06:28:21 GMT
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Viewed:
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359 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Ross Crawford writes:
> This doesn't sound to me like a country whose intentions "were that the war
> was going to continue to the absolute bitter end" and Truman had full
> knowledge of it.
Quite the contrary - see your quoted summary at the bottom. Japan had
rejected the conditions of surrender (to whit, none) and the U.S. was under
no obligation to pause in the war. In fact, it would have been a betrayal
of the American people to do so. Using Russia as a go-between was a poor
choice by Japan - Russia stabbed 'em in the back. You cite endless contacts
with the Russians, but the specifics of what was actually passed on to the
U.S. are not given, and the one thing you do cite as evidence that Truman
knew is only of the general and not the specific (Japan wants terms, and the
U.S. wasn't giving them, so no surrender was eminent, thus, actions were the
final judge).
-->Bruce<--
>
> --- begin quote ---
>
> July 1945 - Japan's peace messages
>
> Still, the messages from Togo to Sato, read by the U.S. at the time, clearly
> indicated that Japan was seeking to end the war:
>
> July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking
> possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war;
> we hope to terminate the war".
>
> July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of
> the war".
>
> July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to
> communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch
> Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His
> Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see:
> U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
>
> July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices
> in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with
> England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the
> National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
>
> July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the
> Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the
> war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st
> communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's
> emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation
> for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary,
> 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box
> 18, National Archives).
>
> July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any
> circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through
> appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the
> Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
>
> July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar
> for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with
> regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the
> Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary,
> 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box
> 18, National Archives).
>
> President Truman knew of the messages' content, noting, for instance, in his
> diary on July 18, "Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of
> telegram from Jap [sic] Emperor asking for peace" (Robert Ferrell, ed., Off
> the Record - the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, pg. 53). In passing up
> this possible opportunity for an earlier and less deadly peace, Truman was
> not deliberately trying to prolong the war so the atomic bomb could be used
> on Japan to intimidate the Soviets. Briefly stated, it is likely that Truman
> believed the use of atomic bombs on Japan was necessary primarily for the
> reasons he always gave: "We have used it in order to shorten the agony of
> war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young
> Americans" (Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945, pg.
> 212). (For the most thorough exposition of the view that the atomic bombs
> were dropped on Japan primarily for their effect on the Soviet Union, see
> Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb. Due to its many sources
> of documentation, this book will be of interest whether one shares
> Alperovitz' views or not).
>
> --- end quote ---
>
> ROSCO
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Message has 1 Reply:
 | | Re: My Concession (for John mostly)
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| (...) You asserted that "[japan's intentions] were that the war was going to continue to the absolute bitter end". What has that to do with US obligation to pause? (...) This may be your opinion, but again has nothing to do with your original (...) (22 years ago, 1-Apr-03, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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Message is in Reply To:
| | Re: My Concession (for John mostly)
|
| (...) This doesn't sound to me like a country whose intentions "were that the war was going to continue to the absolute bitter end" and Truman had full knowledge of it. --- begin quote --- July 1945 - Japan's peace messages Still, the messages from (...) (22 years ago, 1-Apr-03, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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