Subject:
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Re: My Concession (for John mostly)
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Tue, 1 Apr 2003 05:35:05 GMT
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Viewed:
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438 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Bruce Schlickbernd writes:
> In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Ross Crawford writes:
> > In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Bruce Schlickbernd writes:
> > >
> > > Oh no! Not the "should we have dropped 'the bomb'" debate again?!? No,
> > > despite lame attempts at recent revisionism, we had no way to know what
> > > Japan intended beyond its action
> >
> > Wrong. http://www.doug-long.com/
> >
> > > (which were that the war was going to
> > > continue to the absolute bitter end).
> >
> > Wrong again.
> >
> > > The Emperor in fact could not
> > > surrender until he had some face-saving way of doing it.
> >
> > Ah at last something approaching reality! 1 outta 3 aint bad.
> >
> > > Viola! Did him a
> > > favor.
> >
> > Whatever you reckon.
> >
> > ROSCO
>
> 1: I read the site before I posted, and for that matter I read the site the
> previous time this came up. You may wish to actually quote the exact
> passage that you are refering to, since what I read would seem to support me.
This doesn't sound to me like a country whose intentions "were that the war
was going to continue to the absolute bitter end" and Truman had full
knowledge of it.
--- begin quote ---
July 1945 - Japan's peace messages
Still, the messages from Togo to Sato, read by the U.S. at the time, clearly
indicated that Japan was seeking to end the war:
July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking
possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war;
we hope to terminate the war".
July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of
the war".
July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to
communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch
Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His
Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see:
U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices
in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with
England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the
National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the
Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the
war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st
communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's
emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation
for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary,
7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box
18, National Archives).
July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any
circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through
appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the
Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with
regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the
Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary,
7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box
18, National Archives).
President Truman knew of the messages' content, noting, for instance, in his
diary on July 18, "Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of
telegram from Jap [sic] Emperor asking for peace" (Robert Ferrell, ed., Off
the Record - the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, pg. 53). In passing up
this possible opportunity for an earlier and less deadly peace, Truman was
not deliberately trying to prolong the war so the atomic bomb could be used
on Japan to intimidate the Soviets. Briefly stated, it is likely that Truman
believed the use of atomic bombs on Japan was necessary primarily for the
reasons he always gave: "We have used it in order to shorten the agony of
war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young
Americans" (Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945, pg.
212). (For the most thorough exposition of the view that the atomic bombs
were dropped on Japan primarily for their effect on the Soviet Union, see
Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb. Due to its many sources
of documentation, this book will be of interest whether one shares
Alperovitz' views or not).
--- end quote ---
ROSCO
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Message has 1 Reply:
 | | Re: My Concession (for John mostly)
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| (...) Quite the contrary - see your quoted summary at the bottom. Japan had rejected the conditions of surrender (to whit, none) and the U.S. was under no obligation to pause in the war. In fact, it would have been a betrayal of the American people (...) (22 years ago, 1-Apr-03, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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Message is in Reply To:
| | Re: My Concession (for John mostly)
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| (...) 1: I read the site before I posted, and for that matter I read the site the previous time this came up. You may wish to actually quote the exact passage that you are refering to, since what I read would seem to support me. 2: Unsupported (...) (22 years ago, 1-Apr-03, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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