Subject:
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Re: Hotel Palestine
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Sat, 12 Apr 2003 01:07:40 GMT
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Viewed:
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387 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Bruce Schlickbernd writes:
> In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Pedro Silva writes:
>
> > > Not too hard: too slow. Shells are dropping. Mortars require a spotter.
> > > As I said, there are circumstances where you can't shilly-shally (delay,
> > > stall, avoid positive action). Oops! Just lost B company, maybe we can
> > > make a group decision, show of hands, all in favor...
> >
> > That decision is easy to take. In a few words, the tanks can fall back to
> > point "A", where no mortar can reach.
>
> This is what Frank was talking about when he mentioned the circuitous nature
> this conversation has taken on. I say *why* simply pulling back is not the
> answer, and you simply repeat that the thing to do is withdraw without
> addressing my comments on why that is a dubious thing to do. To recap and
> expand: pulling out under fire is in itself perilous. There must be firm
> tactical or strategic reasons for doing so. Otherwise you have: given up
> your objective (clearing the location of the enemy, supporting a flanking
> unit, suppressing enemy fire, etc.); extended the period of combat thereby
> increasing casualties, not decreasing them; have to pay for the same real
> estate twice (increased, not decreased, casualties); handed your enemy a
> method of controlling your actions; exposed your units to fire when it may
> be safer for them to hold their positions or advance (thereby increasing
> casualties, not decreasing them).
(scratching my head)
All that what you've said is what appears reasonable, but strictly from a
military POV. Although the casualties can be (arguably) decreased in regular
action with that quicker method, the risk of catastrophic failure under
exceptional circumstances is highly increased. Which is, from a strictly
civilian POV, much like playing roulette using only two kinds of bets: all
on red (~50% chance to win a little), or to bet in a number (little chance
to earn it all). The difference is you're betting where to lose, not where
to win.
> Note how many times you are not doing the casualty count any favors. If you
> wish to advance the "just retreat until everything is politically
> acceptable" argument, you need to address all this.
Like I say above, casualties can be "many times, few numbers", or
alternatively "few times, large numbers". Which one is better (or worse,
since both are negative)? Why?
> > > The shot was fired to take out what they
> > > believed were spotters for mortar shells that were currently falling. To
> > > stop the mortars, you have to take out the spotter. Any delay means your
> > > units can be ripped to shreds. In fact, you are allowing them the time to
> > > refine their aim.
> >
> > But I'm not advocating delay under exposure - that's why I say fall back,
> > rethink strategy, go back and attack. The aim can be refined, but range is a
> > good protection.
>
> Herein is the problem: you don't seem to understand that you *are*
> advocating delay under exposure. That's the whole point of this, the unit
> was taking mortar fire.
Which has a range, and a rate of fire. A small number of tanks (say two,
three), in an urban environment, has a relatively high chance to make a
strategic withdrawal without getting hit by weaponry with a low level of
accuracy at range (read, small mortars). My argument is, despite there being
a risk at falling back (which is not much greater than standing still over a
bridge, I guess!), it is relatively low under the circumstances.
Heavy shelling would probably be a much worse situation, though.
> > > Please address it from this viewpoint: how will delaying
> > > taking decisive action benefit the safety of the troops under attack?
> > > Waiting out of range simply would mean that the Iraqis could dictate when
> > > they want an attack stopped. What you seem to want is a politically correct
> > > method of conducting war, which transalates to completely ineffective.
> >
> > They can delay attacks this way, true. But they can't help them.
>
> Yes they can, they just do it again, or do it again from a different
> building.
Even for them, would it be feasible in large scale?
Because the number of buildings where that could be done is not that big -
hotels with guests, hospitals with patients, schools with children... all
places that can be previously identified as having a high concentration of
unprotected civilians.
Now take schools, for instance: even those would become a very bad idea to
use (read, with kids inside) as a base; do kids go to school during
bombings? No. So the only way to be there was forced by the iraqui troops -
and that would turn the oppinions in the arab world against Saddam, which he
could not afford at any cost. The same logic can't be applied to hospitals,
but I figure you wouldn't take the hospital the same way the russians did in
Chechnya back in '96 (?)...
> By pinning down operations for political considerations rather
> than tactical ones, they can do it again and again. See Viet Nam for the
> problems of political micro-managing tactical situations (and another case
> of a foolish war to begin with, but that's another debate).
I wouldn't call micro-management of operations to stop the large scale air
raids for political reasons... it was a big decision - macro scale :-)
Of course, I could ask if ultimately you think valid reasons to pin down an
attack are:
a) strictly political;
b) strictly humanitarian;
c) strictly military;
c) mix of a and/or b and/or c;
d) neither;
e) something else.
In the end, like a general once said on the telly, the troops have to think
of political consequences from their actions. And even in terms of
economics, or everyday life.
Figure this example: a sniper is atop the only water tower in a city, where
there is positively no way to improvise another water supply in less than,
say a fortnight. The sniper is a present threat, and has to be taken out
immediately. But what will the consequences of using any explosive armament
to hit him? The water tank will be destroyed... and pretty soon an entire
city will be very hostile to whomever made them thirsty!
Of course action must be taken; but what cost is bearable? It's not only the
killing of civilians that makes an army unwelcome; to the general population
it's the disruption to their everyday life that counts.
> > And there are more ways to win a war than to kill the enemy; all there is to
> > be done is to expurge him of his will to fight.
>
> Yes, and retreating would have ENcouraged them, not discouraged them. You
> push relentlessly until they break - you actually kill less than if you have
> to fight them again.
In the end of a fighting day, would the few minutes used for the sake of
minimizing damage make that much difference?
Or did we (me included) wish for a *quick* war, only because we could not
stand seeing the pics coming in every day, reminding us over and over that
such war was still looking for more reasons to be?
> > > > > Common sense would be to not voluntarily go into a war zone. Common sense
> > > > > would not be to sit in a confused area with no lines with no readily
> > > > > identifiable way of establishing that you are a non-combantant.
> > > >
> > > > One way to identify non-combatants is the absence of armament; true that one
> > > > *combatant* may not be carrying armament, but then again his threat is only
> > > > potential and can be dealt with as such.
> > >
> > > That is not a reliable method, nor would arms necessarily be displayed by a
> > > spotter. War correspondents traditionally are not afforded any slack in war
> > > zones - you are there at your risk.
> >
> > What can I say?
> > How do you know a man is a man, and a woman is a woman, without seeing their
> > cromossomes? You believe appearence. And then you risk calling "Mr." or
> > "Miss", at 50% chance of being right. Oddly, you usually are!
>
> You are saying that you should go by appearances, which is what you have
> been arguing against?
You believe appearence, and you can choose to go by it - but what if
something "odd" catches your attention? What if your first glance only spots
an androginous person? Don't you try to find another way to solve your ID
problem? (I dunno, like *asking around* before greting such person unknown
to you?)
> Do you wish to restate the above? Do I get to repeat
> my encounter at the Computer Games Development Conference that is actually
> relevant to the above (but not to this thread)? :-)
I'm curious by nature, you got my attention! :-P
> > > > > Why shoot in a crowded building with a shell? Imagine yourself in the tank:
> > > > > do you see that the building is crowded? No. What's the best way of taking
> > > > > out the spotter? Main gun.
> > > >
> > > > Assuming it is so, which shell: armor piercing, or explosive? The difference
> > > > is in the area around the target that is hit. Remember, the two reporters
> > > > killed were in different rooms. If a spotter was to be hit, why hit
> > > > unsuspecting people around him too?
> > >
> > > That would be the call of tank commander depending on what he would think to
> > > be the most effective: I would presume high explosive against a building
> > > (armor piercing might penetrate too far and actually be worse). You keep
> > > arguing from the standpoint that somehow the tank commander's first priority
> > > should be that of protecting possible non-military personnel that he can't
> > > see and has no knowledge of, rather than protecting his unit.
> >
> > Exactly.
>
> I don't know how to respond beyond that would be an incredibly stupid
> policy. It would cost more lives than it would ostensibly save. Paralysis
> of action in war is fatal.
And fatalities, are they easier to accept among civilians, who have the
misfortune to be in a warzone, or among the military who is fighting the war?
> > > > > If you shilly-shally, what happens? You and
> > > > > the rest of your unit remain under fire. Your duty? Take out the spotter.
> > > > > You cannot just sit around paralyzed in combat.
> > > >
> > > > The tank can use the boxing tactic and move around. It's a lot more
> > > > complicated to hit a moving target, isn't it? I know a tank isn't exactly
> > > > easy to move around, but it can fall back and later advance from another angle.
> > >
> > > Abandon the rest of the unit to its fate?
> >
> > Oh no, by no means!
> >
> > > Pull the whole attack out while
> > > under fire?
> >
> > A couple minutes could do the trick. And retreating under fire is the same
> > as advancing under fire, and better than to stand still under fire.
>
> See way above. Do not repeat the immediately above until you address that
> or we shall continue in circles.
I won't go on in it. But I haven't changed my mind (still?).
> > > It doesn't make the slightest ounce of military sense.
> >
> > For a footsoldier, it doesn't. For an armored unit, it does; RPG's don't
> > have a very fast rate of fire, and tanks are faster than troops on foot.
>
> Are you saying you know the tactical disposition of all units in the area?
Wasn't it you who wrote there were no footsoldiers there (when I asked if
infantry could have taken the job), 'cause it'd be suicide for them?
> That you can state categorically that there were no soldiers on foot?
Visible, around the tanks, which were being targetted (by whatever it was,
with tiny blasts)? None.
Nearby? Accepting your (or Frank's?) logic, no as well. If there were, then
what about using *them* for the spotter, and leave the tanks to take care of
the opposition ahead?
> That
> the armored units had room to turn or could be driven backwards as easily as
> forwards?
Isn't one of the very basic characteristics of a tank to have its tracks
allowed to drive both ways? I don't get your doubt on this.
> A mortar is not an RPG. Mortars have an *extremely* high rate of
> fire.
1 every what, 5 secs at best? What about aiming corrections every "n" shots,
or worse, against a moving target? And exposure from the operators? (they
too can be exposed).
> This is not to mention that this unit may have been supporting a
> flanking unit, requiring that other unit to halt or retreat, requiring its
> flanking unit to halt or retreat...
I take it the reverse shift is hard to use with tanks? Two of them, having
the tracks in the same alignment as the bridge (which allowed for both to
pass simultaneously), couldn't they fall back in a short time? (I'm not
asking in terms of tactics now, only in terms of operability)
> > > You
> > > nail the spotter by the most expedient means possible. Anything else is
> > > foolish.
> >
> > I'd do it the least messy way possible.
>
> Nailing the spotter by the most expedient means possible *is* the least
> messy way.
Depending if you're near the tank or the spotter. POV in action.
> > > I already explained the situation: no lines, so the troops have no idea of
> > > friend or foe, except by interpretation of actions. It's up to the
> > > reporters to take precautions.
> >
> > Is there any infallible one?
>
> Yes. Stay out of the area. There is no other infallible precaution (and
> space junk in decaying orbit may still fall out of the blue and get you).
> Since news agencies are there to get the news, this is usually not
> completely acceptable, and thus they are taking a calculated risk.
How do they make such calculations, do you have any idea? What do they use
as guidelines for conduct, in order not to jeopardize their lives more than
it is strictly needed for the prosecution of their work?
> > > > Infantry in the other bank (there is more than one bridge), entering the
> > > > hotel. Two men go up. A few bullets, or even a hand grenade. Problem dealt
> > > > with (and think of the media coverage for such a spectacularly precise
> > > > operation!)
> > >
> > > Oops! The mortar had the time to zero in! The whole unit was wiped out!
> >
> > The tank is no longer there.
>
> "Unit". But aside from that, Oops! The enemy had time to reorganize, it
> got wiped out upon return.
Oops! Another tank came in in the enemy's back and blew them to pieces -
they were still awaiting the first tank to reappear!
(Hmmm... a good idea for decoy... bonus: the reorganized enemy unit is
easier to fry than a scattered one!)
> > > Or...Oops! There was a whole squad defending the spotter. Your two men got
> > > wiped out *along* with the unit in the street.
> >
> > A whole squad? In a hotel room, hotel which happened to be loaded with
> > journalists? Wouldn't the troops be tipped off at the lobby?
>
> We are talking about what units must do under fire and the decisions that
> they must make and your sense of complete moral outrage at the decisions
> made.
Right.
> I am trying to address that whereas it was a tragedy, there were
> sound military reasons for doing what they did.
The tragedy in itself was sad and revolting; the extrapolations from how the
incident was conducted are, to me, even worse. And the mere knowledge that
this course of action is perceived as rational behaviour by everyone else
but me is enough reason to lose every hope in mankind :-$
> If one had perfect
> knowledge, then the squad would never have been needed. Delaying for a
> special ops team, which is what you advocated would be a foolish tactical
> delay given the situation.
The spec ops was an example. Possibly there would be more creative choices.
Like you say, we don't have a full picture...
> > > > Proceed forward again with the tanks. Carry on the ops.
> > >
> > > Too late, all gone. More died because of inaction than because of action.
> >
> > If the building were empty of reporters - remember they can act as
> > informants, if goaded into it.
>
> I'm not sure what your point is? That they would violate neutrality and aid
> the Iraqi military? Okaaaaaay, if they want to take sides and be subject to
> a military tribunal headed by Dubya, that's their funeral and I wouldn't cry
> a tear for them. Perhaps I misunderstand you.
Au contraire! Do you suppose any one of those western reporters in the hotel
would be so dumb as to do that? If a sniper/spotter were known to be housed
there by the newscrews, they'd be fully aware of the danger it would
represent to their safety, and would want to eliminate such risk ASAP. Best
way to do it? Tip the future winners of the war and let them take care of it!
> > > > Or, even better, approach from the hotel's side of the river. It is
> > > > possible, IIRC there was one division coming in the city that way.
> > >
> > > What if the targets were not conviently on that side?
> >
> > If they were East of the hotel, they'de be met after the tanks had passed
> > it; If south, then the tanks would have used another bridge, much farther
> > from the building; if West, the tanks would have met it before the hotel.
>
> Are you saying that you know the tactical dispositions of all the troops in
> that area, that you *know* that there weren't already troops in all of those
> locations?
From the North I'm pretty sure noone was coming in; the most likely chance
was an approach from on diision from the Southwest, but last I heard that
one was a bit delayed compared to the rest.
> > Or, in the worse possible option, die with a clear conscience.
>
> And condemn others in your unit to the same death, losing more lives than
> you saved.
Is it the numbers that count? :-O
Perhaps I'm just foolish enough to admit this: I'd risk court martial (or
worse) to stop an action which I thought would make civilians die. I mean, I
can deal with killing an enemy soldier, but I cannot find sense in my life
if I kill an innocent knowingly in the process of achieving some war goal.
That's why I'm not a pacifist, but even worse than one as a potential fighter.
Pedro
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Message has 1 Reply:
 | | Re: Hotel Palestine
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| (...) Yes, it is from a military point of view, but it's a military situation. You can only manage things on a political level down so far, and then it becomes counter-productive. Planes are easier, because there are fewer and thus easier to manage (...) (21 years ago, 12-Apr-03, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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Message is in Reply To:
| | Re: Hotel Palestine
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| (...) This is what Frank was talking about when he mentioned the circuitous nature this conversation has taken on. I say *why* simply pulling back is not the answer, and you simply repeat that the thing to do is withdraw without addressing my (...) (21 years ago, 11-Apr-03, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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