Subject:
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Re: Hotel Palestine
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Sat, 12 Apr 2003 08:12:58 GMT
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Viewed:
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604 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Pedro Silva writes:
> (scratching my head)
> All that what you've said is what appears reasonable, but strictly from a
> military POV. Although the casualties can be (arguably) decreased in regular
> action with that quicker method, the risk of catastrophic failure under
> exceptional circumstances is highly increased. Which is, from a strictly
> civilian POV, much like playing roulette using only two kinds of bets: all
> on red (~50% chance to win a little), or to bet in a number (little chance
> to earn it all). The difference is you're betting where to lose, not where
> to win.
Yes, it is from a military point of view, but it's a military situation.
You can only manage things on a political level down so far, and then it
becomes counter-productive. Planes are easier, because there are fewer and
thus easier to manage and you have the luxury of planning strikes more
precisely. This probably gave the reporters a false sense of security: the
planes don't react to what the reporters are doing, they can poke binoculars
and cameras out the windows and the planes won't care. A cityfight is a
profoundly more chaotic situation.
>
> > Note how many times you are not doing the casualty count any favors. If you
> > wish to advance the "just retreat until everything is politically
> > acceptable" argument, you need to address all this.
>
> Like I say above, casualties can be "many times, few numbers", or
> alternatively "few times, large numbers". Which one is better (or worse,
> since both are negative)? Why?
There is no easy answer to this. From the human standpoint, the one that
produces the least actual damage. From the political standpoint, the one
that produces the least fallout - which may, conversely, be the one that
produces the most casualties. From the military standpoint, the one that
compromises combat effectiveness the least. Realistically: it was one
incident. Fortunes of war (who the heck came up with that saying?
Misfortunes of war is more like it). A dozen different incidents? Maybe
there is something wrong with the rules of engagement, or maybe the
reporters just have no sense whatsoever. Regardless, it's time to look at
your methods and decide if they are at fault or not.
> > > They can delay attacks this way, true. But they can't help them.
> >
> > Yes they can, they just do it again, or do it again from a different
> > building.
>
> Even for them, would it be feasible in large scale?
I can't think of a reason why not.
> Because the number of buildings where that could be done is not that big -
> hotels with guests, hospitals with patients, schools with children... all
> places that can be previously identified as having a high concentration of
> unprotected civilians.
Lots of buildings, very few actually military. You didn't cite apartment
complexes for example. You can figure the vast majority of buildings are
for unprotected civilians. At this point, you'd become paralyzed through
inaction. Further, providing ground level photos from all angles and asking
troops to memorize them becomes a logistical and practical nightmare.
Again, paralysis of action.
> Now take schools, for instance: even those would become a very bad idea to
> use (read, with kids inside) as a base; do kids go to school during
> bombings? No. So the only way to be there was forced by the iraqui troops -
> and that would turn the oppinions in the arab world against Saddam, which he
> could not afford at any cost. The same logic can't be applied to hospitals,
> but I figure you wouldn't take the hospital the same way the russians did in
> Chechnya back in '96 (?)...
Saddam could do so if he can control the coverage. He murders his
population at an astounding rate, but since we see very few images of it,
the world fixates on, say, three reporters getting blown up. Neither is
good, but to illustrate the point, which one are we discussing?
>
> > By pinning down operations for political considerations rather
> > than tactical ones, they can do it again and again. See Viet Nam for the
> > problems of political micro-managing tactical situations (and another case
> > of a foolish war to begin with, but that's another debate).
>
> I wouldn't call micro-management of operations to stop the large scale air
> raids for political reasons... it was a big decision - macro scale :-)
"They can't bomb an outhouse without my knowing about it." Lyndon Baines
Johnson. He didn't understand that he was crippling his military. He also
didn't understand that if he had to micro-manage to that extent to control
the political damage, it was a lost cause and he needed to rethink his
position entirely (but, amazingly, when he was forced to that conclusion by
the campaign of Eugene McCarthy, he did, and withdrew from the campaign).
> Of course, I could ask if ultimately you think valid reasons to pin down an
> attack are:
> a) strictly political;
> b) strictly humanitarian;
> c) strictly military;
> c) mix of a and/or b and/or c;
> d) neither;
> e) something else.
>
> In the end, like a general once said on the telly, the troops have to think
> of political consequences from their actions. And even in terms of
> economics, or everyday life.
> Figure this example: a sniper is atop the only water tower in a city, where
> there is positively no way to improvise another water supply in less than,
> say a fortnight. The sniper is a present threat, and has to be taken out
> immediately. But what will the consequences of using any explosive armament
> to hit him? The water tank will be destroyed... and pretty soon an entire
> city will be very hostile to whomever made them thirsty!
That is not the situation at hand. We are talking about reporters being
misidentified as spotters for a current mortar attack and whether there
should be a delay/withdrawal so there can be a careful investigation of the
building before it is fired at (and logically, virtually every building
since they all potentially are housing non-combatants) or if instead, should
the military proceed on what they deem reasonable cause and fire, knowing
there may well be unintended damage even if they have assessed the situation
correctly.
> Of course action must be taken; but what cost is bearable? It's not only the
> killing of civilians that makes an army unwelcome; to the general population
> it's the disruption to their everyday life that counts.
This is a different situation and is not directly comparable.
>
> > > And there are more ways to win a war than to kill the enemy; all there is to
> > > be done is to expurge him of his will to fight.
> >
> > Yes, and retreating would have ENcouraged them, not discouraged them. You
> > push relentlessly until they break - you actually kill less than if you have
> > to fight them again.
>
> In the end of a fighting day, would the few minutes used for the sake of
> minimizing damage make that much difference?
I've addressed this: odds are you aren't minimizing the damage, you are
maximizing them.
> > > What can I say?
> > > How do you know a man is a man, and a woman is a woman, without seeing their
> > > cromossomes? You believe appearence. And then you risk calling "Mr." or
> > > "Miss", at 50% chance of being right. Oddly, you usually are!
> >
> > You are saying that you should go by appearances, which is what you have
> > been arguing against?
>
> You believe appearence, and you can choose to go by it - but what if
> something "odd" catches your attention? What if your first glance only spots
> an androginous person? Don't you try to find another way to solve your ID
> problem? (I dunno, like *asking around* before greting such person unknown
> to you?)
Put it in perspective: in a war; in *the* most difficult type of combat, a
cityfight; under attack; spotter required; androgynous person has binoculars
and has your unit under observation. Do you interpret actions, or wait
about and ask some questions, keeping in mind all of the proceeding? Oh,
and it isn't only your life at stake.
>
> > Do you wish to restate the above? Do I get to repeat
> > my encounter at the Computer Games Development Conference that is actually
> > relevant to the above (but not to this thread)? :-)
>
> I'm curious by nature, you got my attention! :-P
Now, I've known some really tall women in my life. One towered over her
husband, an Olympic gold medalist in the shot put, and she was short in
comparison to another. But this woman was still six foot three inches
(dang, can't say in meters, two meters is about six foot seven inches).
That's not what caught my eye. BIG hands. BIG feet. BIG adam's apple. It
just leaped out at me: transsexual. Now, I knew of a game designer that had
a sex change, so I figured I knew who it was (Dan/Dani Bunton, designer of
M.U.L.E.). A while later, my I spotted my boss talking to her
(him/it/whatever, I tend to regard the chromosones as the deciding factor,
not the outward appearance). He calls me over, "I want you to meet Jessica"
Hmmm, not Dani. And she says, "Oh, hi Bruce! How are you doing? It's been
a while!"
She knows me? I don't remember her, and I'm sure I would...and then I *did*
remember her: "Richard?!? Well, this is a bit of a change?" I just about
had to do the cartoon pushing of my jaw closed to stop my mouth from hanging
open in surprise, and I'm *not* exaggerating (I remember having to think,
"Close your jaw, it's hanging open"). Used to work with him, big old bushy
beard, good guy.
You never know. Whoosh!
> > I don't know how to respond beyond that would be an incredibly stupid
> > policy. It would cost more lives than it would ostensibly save. Paralysis
> > of action in war is fatal.
>
> And fatalities, are they easier to accept among civilians, who have the
> misfortune to be in a warzone, or among the military who is fighting the war?
The civilians in question were there willfully, not strictly through
misfortune. And the answer in any case is your primary accountablity is to
your own people first given that they had reasonable cause.
> I won't go on in it. But I haven't changed my mind (still?).
I addressed how people change their minds in message to Frank along this
same thread: I don't really expect you to during the course of this
conversation. This is okay. It is even okay that you never change your
mind, and you may not because your mindset is at odds with the nature of war
(see way down at the bottom).
>
> > > > It doesn't make the slightest ounce of military sense.
> > >
> > > For a footsoldier, it doesn't. For an armored unit, it does; RPG's don't
> > > have a very fast rate of fire, and tanks are faster than troops on foot.
> >
> > Are you saying you know the tactical disposition of all units in the area?
>
> Wasn't it you who wrote there were no footsoldiers there (when I asked if
> infantry could have taken the job), 'cause it'd be suicide for them?
No. If a Bradley was there, there could have been footsoldiers. Or
deployed in buildings in the area. The advisablity of moving in the open on
foot during a mortar attack is something else, entirely.
>
> > That you can state categorically that there were no soldiers on foot?
>
> Visible, around the tanks, which were being targetted (by whatever it was,
> with tiny blasts)? None.
Must we do this the hard way with me having to specify everything? In the
vicinity, and not simply displayed in a five second video looking in only
one direction.
> Nearby? Accepting your (or Frank's?) logic, no as well. If there were, then
> what about using *them* for the spotter, and leave the tanks to take care of
> the opposition ahead?
Mortar rounds, remember? Under attack? And that is your supposition, in
any case, not a confirmed and definitive answer (perhaps I'm using an
unfamiliar term in "state categorically". Without fear of fault or
contradiction).
>
> > That
> > the armored units had room to turn or could be driven backwards as easily as
> > forwards?
>
> Isn't one of the very basic characteristics of a tank to have its tracks
> allowed to drive both ways? I don't get your doubt on this.
Driver visiblity. Just because you can doesn't mean that it is easy. The
best way to do it is have the commander stick his head out (remember that
mortar attack?).
>
> > A mortar is not an RPG. Mortars have an *extremely* high rate of
> > fire.
>
> 1 every what, 5 secs at best? What about aiming corrections every "n" shots,
> or worse, against a moving target? And exposure from the operators? (they
> too can be exposed).
One mortar, one shell every five seconds is about right. I don't think you
understand that this is an appalling high rate of fire with high explosives.
And that is one mortar. Five mortars would mean one shell drops every
second. And they are an indirect fire weapon - they fire at a high angle
and lob their shells over intervening obstacles. If they could be observed
directly (i.e. exposed) then they wouldn't have need of a spotter. Half the
point of mortars is that you aren't exposed to direct fire.
>
> > This is not to mention that this unit may have been supporting a
> > flanking unit, requiring that other unit to halt or retreat, requiring its
> > flanking unit to halt or retreat...
>
> I take it the reverse shift is hard to use with tanks? Two of them, having
> the tracks in the same alignment as the bridge (which allowed for both to
> pass simultaneously), couldn't they fall back in a short time? (I'm not
> asking in terms of tactics now, only in terms of operability)
You are talking about one specific tank, on one specific bridge, because
that's all you saw in the five second video. I know it can be difficult to
step outside of powerful imagery, but you can't understand the situation
until you do so.
>
> > > > You
> > > > nail the spotter by the most expedient means possible. Anything else is
> > > > foolish.
> > >
> > > I'd do it the least messy way possible.
> >
> > Nailing the spotter by the most expedient means possible *is* the least
> > messy way.
>
> Depending if you're near the tank or the spotter. POV in action.
From the overall POV, neither the tank's or the spotter's. You are
repeating the error of assuming only the one tank shown in the video is the
totality of what was involved.
>
> > > > I already explained the situation: no lines, so the troops have no idea of
> > > > friend or foe, except by interpretation of actions. It's up to the
> > > > reporters to take precautions.
> > >
> > > Is there any infallible one?
> >
> > Yes. Stay out of the area. There is no other infallible precaution (and
> > space junk in decaying orbit may still fall out of the blue and get you).
> > Since news agencies are there to get the news, this is usually not
> > completely acceptable, and thus they are taking a calculated risk.
>
> How do they make such calculations, do you have any idea? What do they use
> as guidelines for conduct, in order not to jeopardize their lives more than
> it is strictly needed for the prosecution of their work?
Rules of engagement. They were under fire. They had reasonable belief that
due to the nature of the attack, a spotter was required, and they were under
observation by someone with binoculars. This fell into what you just noted
above.
>
> > > > > Infantry in the other bank (there is more than one bridge), entering the
> > > > > hotel. Two men go up. A few bullets, or even a hand grenade. Problem dealt
> > > > > with (and think of the media coverage for such a spectacularly precise
> > > > > operation!)
> > > >
> > > > Oops! The mortar had the time to zero in! The whole unit was wiped out!
> > >
> > > The tank is no longer there.
> >
> > "Unit". But aside from that, Oops! The enemy had time to reorganize, it
> > got wiped out upon return.
>
> Oops! Another tank came in in the enemy's back and blew them to pieces -
> they were still awaiting the first tank to reappear!
And what makes you think that they didn't reoraginze and redeploy on the
next area over while the unit the first was supporting also withdrew (at
your insistence, may I remind you, to check out the building and bring the
entire attack to a halt)? That tank never made it round the back.
> (Hmmm... a good idea for decoy... bonus: the reorganized enemy unit is
> easier to fry than a scattered one!)
But far more dangerous at the same time. Allowing an enemy to dig in and
better situate itself is sheer military folly.
>
> > > > Or...Oops! There was a whole squad defending the spotter. Your two men got
> > > > wiped out *along* with the unit in the street.
> > >
> > > A whole squad? In a hotel room, hotel which happened to be loaded with
> > > journalists? Wouldn't the troops be tipped off at the lobby?
> >
> > We are talking about what units must do under fire and the decisions that
> > they must make and your sense of complete moral outrage at the decisions
> > made.
>
> Right.
...and the apparent complete lack of understanding of military reality that
fuels that moral outrage.
>
> > I am trying to address that whereas it was a tragedy, there were
> > sound military reasons for doing what they did.
>
> The tragedy in itself was sad and revolting; the extrapolations from how the
> incident was conducted are, to me, even worse. And the mere knowledge that
> this course of action is perceived as rational behaviour by everyone else
> but me is enough reason to lose every hope in mankind :-$
But then again, perhaps you merely but profoundly misunderstand the
situation. You give evidence that that is the case on almost every answer
you give (it's not a sniper, there's a mortar which you keep forgetting
about, you don't really seem to understand how a mortar works or its
practical application, you fixate on the video and don't seem to percieve
that there could be other units outside of the camera's view, and any of
another host of points). I can lead a horse to water, but I can't make him
drink.
>
> > If one had perfect
> > knowledge, then the squad would never have been needed. Delaying for a
> > special ops team, which is what you advocated would be a foolish tactical
> > delay given the situation.
>
> The spec ops was an example. Possibly there would be more creative choices.
> Like you say, we don't have a full picture...
Name it, just realize that the unit is under fire. And we are talking about
seconds, not minutes, to resolve the situation.
> > > If the building were empty of reporters - remember they can act as
> > > informants, if goaded into it.
> >
> > I'm not sure what your point is? That they would violate neutrality and aid
> > the Iraqi military? Okaaaaaay, if they want to take sides and be subject to
> > a military tribunal headed by Dubya, that's their funeral and I wouldn't cry
> > a tear for them. Perhaps I misunderstand you.
>
> Au contraire! Do you suppose any one of those western reporters in the hotel
> would be so dumb as to do that? If a sniper/spotter were known to be housed
> there by the newscrews, they'd be fully aware of the danger it would
> represent to their safety, and would want to eliminate such risk ASAP. Best
> way to do it? Tip the future winners of the war and let them take care of it!
Same applies only worse: you choose sides and the the Iraqis just plain
shoot you as a spy!
>
> > > > > Or, even better, approach from the hotel's side of the river. It is
> > > > > possible, IIRC there was one division coming in the city that way.
> > > >
> > > > What if the targets were not conviently on that side?
> > >
> > > If they were East of the hotel, they'de be met after the tanks had passed
> > > it; If south, then the tanks would have used another bridge, much farther
> > > from the building; if West, the tanks would have met it before the hotel.
> >
> > Are you saying that you know the tactical dispositions of all the troops in
> > that area, that you *know* that there weren't already troops in all of those
> > locations?
>
> From the North I'm pretty sure noone was coming in; the most likely chance
> was an approach from on diision from the Southwest, but last I heard that
> one was a bit delayed compared to the rest.
I guess I didn't emphasize the *know* enough.
>
> > > Or, in the worse possible option, die with a clear conscience.
> >
> > And condemn others in your unit to the same death, losing more lives than
> > you saved.
>
> Is it the numbers that count? :-O
Are you saying that a reporter is worth, oh, 10 american troops? 5? 2?
100? Tell me why you don't think numbers should count.
> Perhaps I'm just foolish enough to admit this: I'd risk court martial (or
> worse) to stop an action which I thought would make civilians die. I mean, I
> can deal with killing an enemy soldier, but I cannot find sense in my life
> if I kill an innocent knowingly in the process of achieving some war goal.
> That's why I'm not a pacifist, but even worse than one as a potential fighter.
You'd simply die. You'd be paralyzed with indecision on a battlefield and
that would be it. You could never make a bombing run in an airplane, for
example. You could never fire a shot in a city. Or fire an artillery
shell. Don't join the military. That's okay: the military isn't for
everyone. But don't expect to run a military the way you think: unless you
plan on losing. And then think of the ramifications of losing to an invader.
-->Bruce<--
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Message is in Reply To:
 | | Re: Hotel Palestine
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| (...) (scratching my head) All that what you've said is what appears reasonable, but strictly from a military POV. Although the casualties can be (arguably) decreased in regular action with that quicker method, the risk of catastrophic failure under (...) (21 years ago, 12-Apr-03, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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