Subject:
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Re: The Problem of Evil
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Tue, 5 Dec 2000 04:46:14 GMT
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Viewed:
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177 times
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Mr. Marchetti:
Concerning the problem of evil, you provided an outline of two arguments and
then concluded: "But the point is: the Christian god cannot exist in the
manner in which most Christians envision him to exist. Whatever he may or
may not be, God is other than what Christians have imagined."
I'll comment on your arguments briefly below:
> The problem of evil is normally worded
> in the manner of a theorem, as are
> the following variants:
>
> 1. If God is good, he will want to abolish evil
> 2. If God is all powerful, he must be able to abolish evil
> 3. Evil exists
> [4.] Therefore, an all powerful, good God does not exist
What we need here is a way to make (1) and (2) consistent with (3), which is
fairly easy as a logical problem (though not, I'll admit, as easy to deal
with existentially):
(1) If God is good, he will want to abolish evil
(2) If God is all powerful, he must be able to abolish evil
(3) God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil to persist (for a
time).
(4) Therefore, evil persists (for a time) even though God both wants to, and
is capable of, abolishing evil.
> 1. God is the first cause and created everything
> 2. Evil is something
> [3.] Therefore, God is the creator of evil
Your premise (2) above is questionable. Since at least the time of
Augustine, the common conception of evil has been as a privation of good.
Blindness is the most commonly given example; blindness is not 'something'
in itself - rather, it is the lack of something that 'ought to be'.
> What I find interesting about this problem
> is that either conclusion only matters if
> you happen to believe in good or evil to begin with
> -- which I do not. I think the above "proofs"
> have an intended audience of Christian believers,
> and are essentially meaningless to others outside
> that circle -- however large that circle may in fact
> happen to be.
Actually, the intended audience of the arguments above could be equally
Christians or those who believe in real, objective moral standards. A
number of atheists have believed strongly (rightly or wrongly) in objective
morality; the complaint is that "there is too much evil in the world."
> Me? I don't believe in good or evil -- I believe
> in adversity. I believe that the universe is a
> place where things struggle, not necessarily in
> opposition, but merely for survival. Every living
> thing, every energy, strives for it's own position
> or niche. A fish might eat seaweed or microscopic
> organisms, I eat the fish, something else might eat
> me -- none of us the more evil for having done it.
> Evil is just a word, a conceit to reify the asserted
> nature of human existence -- "O, woe is me!". Good is
> just a word too, the sort of idea one wants to luxuriate
> in when one has done something out of self-interest but
> wants to pretend otherwise.
I always have to wonder if individuals like yourself have thought through
the implications of such a position. Would you mind drawing some of those
out for us in terms of events or actions we commonly consider being moral or
immoral? Also, I'd be interested in knowing what the process was that led
you to such a position.
In a subsequent post, you wrote:
> [Your concept of free will is f]lawed. Prove free will
> rather than determinism. Prove to me that your actions
> are not determined by your nervous system, learned behavior,
> socialization skills, etc.
>
> Free will is an idea I tend to agree with because I find
> it aesthetically far more pleasing than determinism
> -- but then again, I couldn't prove the existence of
> free will beyond my own doubts about the idea.
I would agree that your worldview (which I take to be naturalism/atheism)
results in a deterministic universe without free will. I'm curious about
your statement above that you "agree with [free will] because" you "find it
aesthetically pleasing." I've yet to meet a naturalist that wants to part
with free will, even though they can't make sense of it. Why do you suppose
that is?
I think its because it is so intuitive that we are in possession of some
form of freedom (whatever the boundaries); it seems difficult if not
impossible to avoid relying on the notion in everyday practice. As
(naturalist) philosopher of mind John Searle has written, "There are all
sorts of experiences we have in life where it seems just a fact of our
experience that though we did one thing, we feel we know perfectly well that
we could have done something else." When I will to raise my arm, it seems
apparent that I could have willed to not raise it, at my option.
The presence of such strong intuitions (so strong that even determinists
have trouble parting with them) would seem to me to constitute a good prima
facie case for some form of libertarian free will. To reject this common
sense understanding of will and action looks like a form of radical
skepticism to me - something to be put alongside the rejection of a
mind-independent external world, or the general reliability of our senses to
perceive that world, or of language to adequately describe the world we live
in (all assumptions necessary to science, by the way).
There are a number of other arguments that could be made here, but I'll
leave you with this thought: If mechanistic determinism is true (which would
seem to follow from naturalism), then your own beliefs and statements
concerning determinism (not to mention atheism and Christianity) are
themselves determined. You could do nothing but believe in determinism, and
I could do nothing but believe in libertarian freedom. As an example of
this, consider a brief exchange between Philip Johnson and Nobel
Prize-Winning chemist Arthur Cornberg:
"[Cornberg] gave a lecture to the AAAS, the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, in which he told the scientists, 'I am shocked -
positively shocked - that many otherwise intelligent people including
medical doctors do not understand that mind as a part of nature is chemistry
and only chemistry.' You see, that's the materialist understanding of the
mind, and I [Johnson] wrote to him... I said, Dr. Cornberg, I can clear this
mystery up for you: The reason they don't believe that the mind is only
chemistry is they have certain chemicals in their brains that cause them to
form this erroneous understanding, whereas you have different chemicals
which cause you to believe that the mind is the product of chemistry."
If determinism were true, it should result in a profound skepticism of
determinism itself. As another participant on this board put it, it is
better to presuppose free will. But if free will is the more rational
option, then naturalism has a lot more explaining to do than theism.
> Moreover, Free Will presupposes choices. So basically,
> a Christian god needs his devil, doesn't he? I guess
> that puts them pretty much on the same team. Ever read
> the Book of Job? See what I mean?
That seems as strange to me as saying that the existence of logic requires
that someone utilize unsound arguments. It is one thing to allow for the
potential for evil alongside the good; quite another to actualize that evil.
His purpose in allowing evil, in my mind, is to maximize the good (reread
Job in light of the story of Joseph). Furthermore, God commands us to do
good and warns us of the consequences of evil (temporal and eternal), among
other things (I'm being exceedingly brief here). And of course He plans to
put an end to evil at the appointed time. That hardly sounds to me like
they're on the same team, but you're entitled to your opinion.
Looking forward to your thoughts on what I've written above. Take care,
Steve
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Message is in Reply To:
 | | The Problem of Evil
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| Hey Y'all: I see some of you exerting some considerable effort around the subject of the problem of evil. I thought I might summarize the essentials if I might... The problem of evil is normally worded in the manner of a theorem, as are the (...) (24 years ago, 2-Dec-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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