 | | Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | I see at least four distinct potential abilities related to property. I don't believe that any of these can be derived from any other. These may or may not be things that one can do with property (or, ahem, properties of property), and there may or (...) (25 years ago, 9-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | | | Ok. Here's some thoughts on answers to my own questions. I should start by saying that I'm not here assuming that property is a natural right -- it seems to be constructed. Nonetheless, much of this applies either way. I'd still like Larry and (...) (25 years ago, 10-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | | | | I'd like to introduce some terminology. The rights [1] in my earlier message I'd like to call "basic property rights" [2]. That is: * The right to, through interacting constructively with things in the universe, mark those things as mine. * The (...) (25 years ago, 10-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | | I realized that last night I failed to address an important question I'd raised earlier: (...) The ideas I've expressed <URL:(URL) apply only to the physical universe -- that is, matter (and potentially energy, because of that equivalence thing). (...) (25 years ago, 10-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Christopher L. Weeks
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| | | | (...) Well, if you are meaning a mind as different than a brain, I think it's safe to just call it an idea (in the context you use above). It's a complex bit of software. Whatever intellectual property rights arise from this whole discussion would (...) (25 years ago, 11-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | | (...) That's not clear at all. The mind-as-software concept is one way it may possibly be, but that's actually a fairly radical view. It's something I'm agnostic about until we've got further information. In the meantime, this is such an important (...) (25 years ago, 11-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | | (...) To expand on my late-night thoughts: If the way we gain property is through "mixing of labor", or interaction [1], minds can't be property. I don't labor on my mind, and I don't interact with it. I am it. You might ascribe some sort of (...) (25 years ago, 11-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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