Subject:
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Re: Vegetarianism etc. (was: Re: Why is AIDS such a big deal?)
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Thu, 1 Jun 2000 15:00:12 GMT
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Viewed:
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1501 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Christopher L. Weeks writes:
> In lugnet.off-topic.debate, James Simpson writes:
> > In theological terms, Christians believe that Christ has fulfilled all of the
> > ancient laws for us; we are now under the new covenant;
>
> Why not do away witht the old testament then - as part of scripture, only -
> obviously it would retain historical value.
It still has enormous theological value; the difference is that it is now read
and understood in light of our fuller understanding of God as compiled in the
New Testament.
>
> > I believe that gratuitous killing includes killing for sport, but I'm not
> > prepared to say that killing for meat because it tastes good is inherently
> > gratuitious. Please see my comments on duty below. • ...
> > I do not find a compelling moral imperative as a purely
> > biological creature to refrain from that practice.
>
> But you aren't a _purely_ biological creature, you're not merely animal. There
> is a significant difference between humans and the other animals based on
> "transcendental qualities." I got the idea that you would attribute these
> differences to non-biological foundations.
Ok...I concede the point that it was inconsistent to include moral reasoning in
the merely-animal sense, after I had stated that moral reasoning does not apply
in that sphere. The point that I was trying to make is that though humans are
fully-animal (we possess all of the requisite traits that define animals, in
full), we also possess something more that makes us not-merely-animal); however,
from an argument that begins in the merely-animal sphere (and then progresses to
the fully-but-not-merely-sphere), I can still find no compelling biological
reason that would require any creature whose biology will allow it to consume
meat, to refrain from that practice. Basically, I was trying to build an
argument from the ground, and work up, if you will (from creatures that exist on
a wholly biological basis to creatures (such as man) that operate also on a
moral framework.) I think that one subpoint is in order here:
We have already discussed the gray area of "soulish" creatures that have strong
emotional or personality traits. I would argue that such a capacity for feeling
does indeed increase these creature's inherent values when their competing
claims must be weighed. I am not convinced (though I may be wrong) that these
animals indeed possess moral cognizance (which would increase their inherent
value.) I'd like to illustrate this with 2 subpoints:
1. Arguing simply from my own subjective experience (which is by no means
exhaustive, but, observance is a bedrock of hypothesis), I have not met any
animal that seems to operate from a moral cognizance. I have a dog that is a
dear, sweet, faithful animal (faithfulness does not necessarily signal moral
awareness in this case - it could be argued to be a factor of conditioning).
Though it was rescued from the very threshhold of death while being mauled by 2
pit bulls, it nonetheless does not hesitate to chase any weaker animals that it
can find. Perhaps this dog is closer to moral cognizance on a continuum
(because it does possess some very "soulish" traits), but it does not have an
understanding of fairness or mercy; it seems to be governed mostly by instinct
and desire, rather than from a free-will suppositional basis.
2. If you could chose to be reincarnated as either a human or a horse, would you
not chose to return as a human, because in examining the inherent qualities of
the 2 creatures, the human is endowed with faculties that render it able to
experience an altogether Better existence? (I use the word Better very
objectively here - the ability to love in deeper levels, the ability to
comprehend, to inquire on deeper levels is inherently Better than to lack such
faculties.) (Also, it is true that a horse could have a happier existence than
a man who is afflicted by any number of misfortunes; yet, in terms of objective
possibilities, the man is capable (i.e., has the potential) of experiencing a
qualitatively Better existence than is the horse.)
>
> > Regarding my existence as a free moral agent...
> > (An example of a moral imperative which will always have
> > a claim on my behavior is that I may never kill other
> > people because I wish to claim their property as my own.)
>
> Is that based on the value difference between people and other animals?
It is indeed a value difference, but, the principle does have its applications
in terms of animals (although I clearly do not believe that one may never kill
an animal to claim its property as one's own - pelts, sinews, meat, etc. may at
times be justifiably used by humans; thus, the principle is not an absolute
moral imperative in regards to animals.) I hesitate to offer an application of
the rights of personal property to animals, as I am currently wearing leather
shoes, and any attempt that I might make would no doubt be hypocrisy. I'd
suggest that a moral imperative which applies to animals is that we objectively
have no right to inflict gratuitous suffering (an example would be sport) upon
them (cock fighting would be a very good example.)
> First, I think that 'rights' are a human construct. They don't exist. We get
> together in groups, decide which rights we want to honor - so that we can
> expect ours to be honored - and pat each other on the back for being so
> exhaulted. Rights are a pleasant fiction and neither the lamb nor the lion
> have any since they don't seem to comprehend them.
>
> But rights isn't normally the stand from which I argue my beliefs. Ultimately,
> it makes me feel better to act the way I do. And to show others how the world
> would be better if y'all joined me. I would say that the other animals have as
> much right to live unimpeded as we do, but that's not exactly supporting their
> rights, it's more undermining the idea of rights.
By stating that inherent rights do not exist for any creatures, and that rights
are constructs of the powerful, you seem to take the teeth out of your position.
If rights are no better than those who have the strenght to assign them, and if
said rights have no greater pressing claim than personal whim or arbitrary
utility, then what grounds do you have to assert that people who willingly
support the way in which we make calves anemic in order to enjoy their meat (as
veal) are evil? As such, evil does not exist because to call an action evil is
by nature to compare it to a set of objective and true standards which have a
just claim of judgment upon the action. But by your definition, all rights are
really arbitrary - they are beholden to no solid standards by which we may
scrutinize our behavior.. Granted, you are certainly a kinder person, but one
could argue that such kindness would also be an arbitrary whim; you are simply
doing what you have the right to do, and those who torture baby animals are
simply doing what they have the right to do. I see your point that even if
rights are not objective, kindness is still better; and I agree, kindness is
indeed better; but kindness is not always practiced. How can we really convince
the unkind that kindness is objectively better when we can depend upon no
principles before which even the most powerful stand guilty? I'd prefer to say
that we should be kind to animals because animals are qualitatively the sort of
creatures that deserve kindness; and this principle is every bit as objective as
the principles that state that a square must always contain 4 right angles; such
things just Are.
BTW, thanks for the link on the Parsee religion. I'll definitely check it out.
James
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