Subject:
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Re: One of my issues (Warning: even wordier than usual)
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Fri, 16 Nov 2001 17:57:45 GMT
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Viewed:
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1265 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Dave Schuler writes:
> In lugnet.off-topic.debate, James Brown writes:
>
> > If you can conceive of a being that can do something that can't be done, I'm
> > impressed - but I don't think you can, by definition. If a being (God or
> > otherwise) can do something, then that something isn't impossible. "doing
> > the impossible" is a null statement, and logically contradicts itself.
>
> I can conceive of such a being in at least abstract terms, such as "that
> being which is not bound by our definition of logical impossibility."
So in other words, you're changing your definition of impossible. You are
restricting impossible to mean "impossible within my frame of reference".
> > Now, if you mean you can conceive of something that is impossible *as you
> > understand how things work* that's in many regards very different. It's
> > easy to concieve of something that is greater than my understanding.
>
> And mine too, but I'll stand by the logical impossibility requirement. If
> you have any notion at all of the Christian God, then I'd say you have at
> least a few ideas about a being able to perform logical impossibilities, such
> as being one entity and three entities (if you accept the doctrine of the
> Trinity) or a being that existed "before" time. I don't mean to play word
> games, either, since those would be beneath an infinite being; I mean
> literally existing as three entities and also being one single entity, and
> existing *before* time, rather than "existing in a time before our notion of
> time." If either of these can be demonstrated to me, than I'll believe I've
> witnessed a miracle and will become the most ardent Christian apologist the
> world has ever known.
Dave E addressed this more eloquently than I can, I suspect, so I will only
comment that you are again attempting to establish a frame of reference, and
then postulate beyond it as an invalidation of God.
> Further, the very act of claiming certain things to be off-limits in this
> way is to commit the falacy of the receding target:
>
> A: "God is infinite and can do anything."
> B: "Can he create a rock he can't lift?"
> A: "No, but that doesn't count."
<snip chain>
You're giving the wrong answer from A. The correct answer is "if it can be
done, yes. It seems paradoxical to me, but I have a finite frame of reference."
> > In my opinion, the (mostly synonimous) "God is that which there is nothing
> > greater than"(1) and "with God all things are possible" and "God is
> > omni-(whatever)" are all attempts to convey the concept or belief that God
> > is greater than human understanding.
>
> But that's really not enough, is it? If he's simply beyond our ability to
> comprehend, then he's not necessarily infinite, so he's hardly the absolute
> being.
Not necessarily, but that doesn't also mean he isn't, does it? You're
making a leap that isn't logically present. From the premise (God is beyond
our ability to comprehend), you conclude God is limited. That's the logical
equivalent of:
I am 5 feet tall.
You are taller than I am.
Therefore, you are 6 feet tall.
Not enough information.
> > Taken at face value, you are stating that because morality does not submit
> > empirical study, it has no value. Maybe I'm just not following the thread
> > back far enough?
>
> I may also have been unclear. I would say categorically that a phenomenon
> that can be demonstrated empirically always trumps a phenomenon that cannot be
> demonstrated empirically, so it is invalid to equate one with the other in
> terms of existence external to man's invention. Further, if we have two
> explanations for a phenomenon--one of them empircal and one of them
> non-empirical--the empirical one is superior because it can be demonstrated
> and requires neither faith nor the appeal to supernatural processes.
I disgree. I would say that the empirical one is not necessarily superior,
but is merely more empirical. You are comparing apples and oranges, I think.
> > > I don't understand how a Christian reconciles his view of morality with God
> > > in terms of how each applies or relates to the other.
>
> > I think you're making this a lot more complicated than it needs to be, or
> > you are perhaps arguing to the absurd. How are you seeing a Christian's
> > morality as irreconcilable with God? I really must confess that I don't get
> > this last bit at all. Could you maybe provide some more depth to this?
> > Your comment seems nonsensical to me, in the same sort of way that "how does
> > the flavor of food relate to it's taste" seems absurd.
>
> Well, your example question suggests that you perceive God to be inseparable
> from morality, and for me that's the basic problem.
I struggled with that, and it doesn't convey what I wanted it to, but I
couldn't find anything better. :/
> Take a No-Doze, because here's where it gets particulary verbose...
> Here are three possibilities that present themselves to me, assuming that both
> God and morality exist (and please feel free to offer more possibilities, since
> it's late as I write this):
> 1. God is subject to morality
> 2. God is not subject to morality
> 3. God is morality
>
> The benefit of 1 is that it allows us to posit an absolute morality separate
> from God and inherent in existence without appealing to any one being for
> moral justification. The problem of 1 is that if God is subject to morality,
> then he is not greater than morality, and so his existence is not ultimate.
I don't particularly think this is a commonly held belief, but I will say
that this is again attempting to limit God to your frame of reference. I
can abstract a God that is greater than morality and is still limited by it.
You're attempting to create the receding target again.
> The benefit of 2 is that God remains superior to morality, so that nothing
> exists that is greater than God, thereby preserving his ultimate status. The
> problem of 2 is that, if God is not subject to morality, and since we judge
> good and evil in terms of morality, then we cannot judge God to be good, since
> he is above the mechanism that would allow us to judge him so.
I suspect most christian beliefs fall into this catagory. I would further
add that most christians (who thought about it this much) would ammend it to
say "...but chooses to be".
> The benefit of 3 is that it allows God to remain the ultimate being, and it
> also allows morality to be inherent in existence since exists more certainly
> than something that is omnipresent, such as God. The problem of 3 is that I
> don't think anyone really believes it, other than in a "God is Love" sense,
> which doesn't really bring us any closer to an answer.
It isn't something I've particularly considered, but at an initial prodding,
I don't have any problems conceiving that God is morality. I don't think it
would be an even equation though; All of morality may well be encompassed by
all that is God, but not vice versa.
> We might also invoke Hume and point out that if we can get to morality
> without the need of a god, then it's preferable to do so, since we don't
> therefore have to posit the existence of any other being, much less an
> infinite being.
Probably true, but I would cynically answer that I don't think humanity (as
an aggregate, not necessarily as individuals) has pushed social evolution to
a point where a moral code can easily be seperated from a higher authority
conceptually.
It also doesn't address "...but what if God is there anyway?"
> One might propose the possibility that morality is a function of God's
> creation, and he chooses to allow himself to be subject to it in some ways.
> But that doesn't work either, since for one thing it's circular reasoning, and
> for another it still doesn't really allow us to judge his goodness.
Why not? If I conceive of, and follow, a moral code, am I not being good by
doing so? In fact, aren't I being *more* good by choosing to follow it
instead of being constrained to follow it?
> So in essence, and all other impossibility questions aside, I'm asking how
> believers know God to be good. Personal experience is frankly inadequate
> proof for anyone who does not already believe, so we can refrain from those
> testimonials; otherwise, we must also accept the existence of bigfoot and
> UFOs.
Believer's don't know. Believers believe. A belief can acheive such
strength that it is as firm as "knowledge"(1), and many people are imprecise
in their language.
> In attempting to refute God's existence, non-believers will sometimes point
> to the existence of evil as a contradiction to the nature of God. First of
> all, that's never actually been answered satisfactorily, but often the answer
> is "we can't know his divine plan" or "we can't comprehend the infinite." I
> don't intend either of these as straw men arguments, so if someone can
> articulate a better answer, please do so. In any case, if we can't know his
> divine plan, or if we can't comprehend the infinite, then we absolutely can't
> judge him to be good, since we are by definition accepting an
> infinitessimally small sample of his character as adequate representation of
> his whole.
Nope, we can't *judge* God to be good, but we can *believe* God to be good.
Of course, you're going to come back and say that belief is not empirical
proof, and isn't sufficient to convince you. That's OK, becuase I'm not
trying to convince you.
(whew, pant pant)
thanks,
James
1:IMHO, "knowledge" is just very strong and commonly accepted faith, but I'm
not going to open that can of worms today.
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