 | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Christopher L. Weeks
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| | | (...) Well, if you are meaning a mind as different than a brain, I think it's safe to just call it an idea (in the context you use above). It's a complex bit of software. Whatever intellectual property rights arise from this whole discussion would (...) (25 years ago, 11-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | | (...) That's not clear at all. The mind-as-software concept is one way it may possibly be, but that's actually a fairly radical view. It's something I'm agnostic about until we've got further information. In the meantime, this is such an important (...) (25 years ago, 11-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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| | | | | | Re: Questions about the nature of property rights (was Re: ("life affirming" == "no initiation of force") == "all rigihts are property rights"?) —Matthew Miller
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| | | | (...) To expand on my late-night thoughts: If the way we gain property is through "mixing of labor", or interaction [1], minds can't be property. I don't labor on my mind, and I don't interact with it. I am it. You might ascribe some sort of (...) (25 years ago, 11-Jan-00, to lugnet.off-topic.debate)
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