Subject:
|
Re: Did animals have rights before we invented rights?
|
Newsgroups:
|
lugnet.off-topic.debate
|
Date:
|
Wed, 11 Jul 2001 23:01:05 GMT
|
Viewed:
|
1124 times
|
| |
|
|
In lugnet.off-topic.debate, Scott Arthur writes:
> In lugnet.off-topic.debate, David Eaton writes:
> > > I think we should not compare our morals with the lion’s decision making
> > > process.
> >
> > So. You admit you were wrong to disagree with Larry about his assessment of
> > your position as being that the Lion was amoral?
>
> no. Calling it amoral compares it to us does it not?
Not by my watch. If you were unclear on the issue you probably should've
asked Larry what he meant by amoral. Otherwise, you must explain what
definition you though Larry was using, explain why it's not what you're
saying, AND explain the definition you WERE using by agreeing on thier
amorality.
Hence, since you've defined your position as stating that the lion's action
could not be fit into a moral framework, explain how being amoral differs
from that.
> > > > So the reason it's "more ok" to judge family/friends is because your moral
> > > > codes are likely to be very similar?
> > >
> > > i think "judge" is rather strong a word.
> >
> > Do you think "judge" is incorrect?
>
> no.
Alright, so it's *correct* but it *sounds* harsh? Any words sound better?
> > > > You failed to answer the question. The question is what is the CONSEQUENCE
> > > > of judging others based on your own morality?
> > >
> > > The consequence is that it annoys them.
> >
> > Excellent! So if I wish to avoid annoying them, I shouldn't judge others by
> > my own moral code. If I don't CARE about annoying them, I can go right ahead
> > and judge morally.
>
> What is your point?
The point is, you told me that I (Larry specifically) "shouldn't" judge
others-- I wanted to know why, so that I can decide (using your logic)
whether or not I still may *want* to do so, and decide that the consequence
is acceptable.
Your response is apparently that if I'm willing to pay the price of annoying
people, it's absoloutely fine for me to judge others. I would argue
differently. I would say the consequence is that you can very easily be
wrong. Hence, if you can accept the price of being potentially wrong, it's
fine for you to judge others. Hence, we're arguing the same point, for
different reasons, I think.
> Yes, but I do not have to stop myself - I am not tempted.
I flat don't believe you. You almost positively and absoloutely cannot
convince me otherwise. I am nearly 100% thoroughly convinced that it is your
moral sense which has developed a learned reaction not to be tempted, not
that you are never tempted. And if that temptation ever grows stronger, your
moral sense will try to keep it in check by reinforcing negative
consequence. I don't really see a point in arguing this though-- Quite
clearly arguing your personal subconscious desires is not easily subject to
my (nor your!) observative abilities.
> > I specifically and intentionally included the word "necessary" in the
> > original question. I shall take the above as an admission that you were
> > incorrect to say "a great deal"?
>
> It is possible, but highly improbable that there will be no difference.
>
> > > Do you want a list?
> >
> > Yes. And apparently, since above you think there ARE no *necessary*
> > differences (other than the origin, which isn't really the subject of the
> > debate, and which I already mentioned), I would assume that your list would
> > consist of nothing?
>
> You'd be incorrect.
You just lost. You JUST stated above (in the same post, even) that it is
*possible* to have cases wherein there are no differences. Hence, because
*necessary* differences MUST be included in EVERY comparison between social
and individual moral codes, your list of *necessary* differences is
therefore nothing.
I suppose your other option is to say that you were wrong to say it were
possible to have no differences in the first place.
Anyway, assuming I'm wrong, I'm still waiting for even a partial list, let
alone a complete one-- unless of course your list *was* nothing (as I
assumed but you told me was incorrect), in which case, you actually DID
answer my question nice and completely, by giving a 100% complete list of
absoloutely nothing. But then you shouldn't have said I was incorrect to
assume so-- unless you have some sort of proof that my assumption was incorrect?
> > Thanks for the specification. I can only assume that you mean your criticism
> > wherein you accused Larry of passing judgement on others, and that by doing
> > so he was conceited? Yes-- Kind of. He's only conceited if he believes that
> > he is not wrong and does not concede the possibility that his moral
> > judgement may be flawed.
>
> But if he is willing to say "pass judgement", rather than (say) "discuss
> with them" does that not imply that, by your system, that he is conceited?
Not necessarily. "Passing judgement" does not necessarily mean "final
answer". And that's not to say that I don't think Larry's not conceited.
Clearly he has views on morality that I'm convinced are absoloutely wrong,
as evidenced in previous debates (really just one) that we had on relative
morality. And assuming that he holds to that, he has the potential to be
conceited, and I would even believe it to be so. But that does not mean that
*I* am decided on the issue, solely because I'm unsure that *he's* decided
on the issue.
And likewise, according to my system, if he says "Your act was immoral",
without further qualifying any possibility otherwise, he is (as judged by
me) 99% wrong, and 100% conceited. But if he said "Your act was immoral by
my personal judgement" (and nothing more), he is 0% wrong, and, oh, say, 75%
conceited, merely because by specifying his own moral code, he allows the
possibility of OTHER moral codes. If he insists that his code *is* the *one*
"true" code, then he's back to being 100% conceited.
And likewise, if he's willing to admit that he may be wrong, but that he
still thinks you're immoral (by any standard), then he's a lot less conceited.
> > I'll ask again. You say "We may well be concieted [for passing judgement on
> > societies]", which is different that what you originally said, which was
> > that it *is* conceited (which I take to mean "always" in such a theoretical
> > debate, when stating something so flatly) to pass such a judgement.
> >
> > Hence, you're either *clarifying* your previous position(to mean exactly
> > what I'm saying?), OR you're saying something different. ARE we necessarily
> > conceited for passing judgement on society? If not, what factors contribute
> > to conceit? What is it that makes someone conceited for making such a
> > judgement, and what is it that makes someone NOT conceited for making that
> > same judgement?
>
> We may be viewed as being conceited for passing judgement on another
> culture. But if, say, it is to protect lives-
How does passing moral judgement protect lives?
> that it is worth being called conceited.
Did you mean to say "not conceited" above? If not, then please clarify when
someone is NOT conceited. See below questions.
> There is a world of difference between that and passing judgement
> on an individual for having, say, no dietary constraint or being gay.
Individuals aren't the issue at this point. I wasn't asking about that.
1) When (example) is it conceited to place a moral judgement on a society's
morals?
1A) Why is it conceited to do so in this instance?
2) When (example) is it NOT conceited to judge a society's morals?
2B) Why is it NOT conceited to do so in this instance?
Feel free to replace "society" with "individual" in these questions,
HOWEVER, make sure that they match up if you do. If you give an example of
passing judgement on an individual in 1), do the same for 2) & visa versa.
DaveE
|
|
Message has 1 Reply:
Message is in Reply To:
244 Messages in This Thread:
(Inline display suppressed due to large size. Click Dots below to view.)
- Entire Thread on One Page:
- Nested:
All | Brief | Compact | Dots
Linear:
All | Brief | Compact
This Message and its Replies on One Page:
- Nested:
All | Brief | Compact | Dots
Linear:
All | Brief | Compact
|
|
|
|
