Subject:
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Re: 22/7 & infinities (was: Re: The nature of the JC god, good or evil?)
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Newsgroups:
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lugnet.off-topic.debate
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Date:
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Tue, 14 Sep 1999 14:07:47 GMT
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Viewed:
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1620 times
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In lugnet.off-topic.debate, John DiRienzo writes:
> David, I think you are using definition #1, while we are using definition
> #2...
> 1 : a natural or inherent aptitude, impulse, or capacity <had an instinct
> for the right word>
> 2 a : a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make
> a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli
> without involving reason b : behavior that is mediated by reactions below
> the conscious level
>
> The dictionary itself shows us that there are different "levels" as you
> said. My point is that animals aren't able to reason. They act according
> to instinct (#2 above), not reason. Definition 2b covers even more -
> showing that animals might be trained (through repetitive use of cause and
> effect) but they can't reason, they can't comprehend that which we (most of
> us? some of us?) can.
Ok, well, I'm not really concerned with what the dictionary says. Ask the
dictionary what morality is, and I bet it won't define it as well as we've
tried to here. If you want quick terminology, go to the dictionary; if you
really want the REAL definition, you've got to think about it, because
traditional language just won't do in some places. I think of instinct in the
manner I said earlier... a behavior which results without thought. My point was
that there isn't really a line to divide between reasoned action and instinct--
there are different levels of thought you can put into an action. I think the
distinction between conditioned response and reflex is certainly there, but I
think I'm leaning towards both of these categories being defined under
instinct. Anyway, to answer you, I think I'm using a more general term, I think
your definitions are the specifics... at this point I'm not too concerned with
the specifics...
Anyway, let's go to animals. Do they think? What is reason? Why can't animals
reason? I would argue that conditioned response *is* reason. It's certainly not
as elevated a reasoning capacity as we have, but it's still reasoning power.
The animal does the trick when it's told, it gets the treat. The same thing
happens again. Then the animal starts to make a connection, *in thought*-- "if
I do the trick, then I'll get fed!" Further thought shows that "if I do the
trick when I'm told to, then I'll get fed!" It's the same in people, but it
gets more complex. Again (with respect to Hegel) it's not all distinct lines to
be drawn... this is what a whole heck of a lot of philosophers thought way back
a long time ago. Of course they thought this largely because they were working
from a religious base: 'God created man in his own image', vs. all the other
animals who weren't magically 'endowed' with the capacity for thought. It was a
natural conclusion that GIVEN that man was special in his creation, as being
closer to God, that animals didn't have *any* capacity for thought. But more
modernistically, we realize that humans are just an evolved form of animals.
There is no *distinct line*... The point is, animals *do* think, some more than
others. Take chimps. There was a chimp (somewhere, I can't name the study) that
had playtime at a certain time every day (what playtime constituted, I don't
know). It also was taught (WAS TAUGHT!) to read the clock (not to mention basic
sign language!) So it tried (and succeeded, coincidentally) to move the clock
hands (when the trainer wasn't looking) to make it be playtime. When the
trainer came back, the chimp gestured to the clock, wanting playtime... Case of
reason? I'd say so. Conditioned response? That too. The point is that it can
think.
> They can't comprehend good or bad, justice, charity,
> or any of the things we have been discussing. They don't know such things,
> and thus their morals are perfect *for them*. Nietzsche seemed to admire
> that in them. A human being is a superior being, there is no doubt in my
> mind, and like it or not, does not have an automatic, unbreakable moral.
> Man has the greatest tool of survival of any creature, the mind, but he has
> to choose to use it. Choosing not to is immoral.
Interesting point. "Choosing to think." Wouldn't the act of choosing be a
thought in and of itself? Let's go back to the earliest homo-sapiens. The
genetics hasn't changed too much, but I think it'd be fair to still call them
animals by your definition. They *could* think, but didn't.. probably because
there wasn't a society around them encouraging them to, but still, for whatever
reason, they didn't think at the level we do. Did they *choose* not to think? I
think they just simply weren't encouraged enough. And further, what if we
regard people who are retarded? They can choose to think, but they still won't
get to the level we can get to. Are they excused from morality? I think you'd
answer yes (at least in part), since they don't have the potential for thought
that we do. But then this draws the line issue even further. What about stupid
people? Not retarded, just plain dumb? Go further, what about slightly below
average people? What about average people?, etc.? Are we to expect different
levels of morality from different people, based on their mental capacity? Does
this mean it's ok if a stupid person steals, because he couldn't comprehend
morality as much as us? (assuming we're all intelligent people here) My point
is that I think this road leads us in my direction, towards relative morality,
which you want to steer clear of (or so you said before). Basically, I'm
looking for you to define a line between those who you hold to be morally
obligated (humans, you say) and those who aren't (animals, you say). And I
don't really think you can argue that thought is a viable line, since there are
clearly different levels of thought; not only in humans, but in all animals, us
included. I'll try and give you a form for an answer... assuming that the line
is within the realm of thought, what specific conclusion or specific thought is
needed before the mind is obligated to follow morality? Is it recognition of
equality? Recognition of other beings? Is it an emotional desire? Because I
disagree with the idea in general, I'll most likely disagree, but it is
concievable that you could generate an argument here that I can't dispute. I
don't see one, but maybe you have one-- I see all of thought as a progressive
deveopment, not as distinct lines. So maybe you'll have to argue that something
other than thought or reason as what defines moral obligation, but I don't see
a path that you'd want to take. The other paths I see are the divine (you'd be
'damned' to take this path :) ) or the emotional (you've tried to steer clear
of this in the past, I'd guess you still will) or the instinctual (this could
be argued, I suppose, but again, I don't see hard lines within it.. it all
leads to varied moral scales, not a universal one). Or maybe a combination of
these? Are there other paths? Maybe, but I don't see them offhand. Maybe you
do. If so, please expound.
> Thats interesting. It could be what the writer meant. Its a good play on
> words, and I have one, too. Somebody wrote, "I think therefore I am."
> Someone else wrote, "To be or not to be..." On the latter, I see "to think
> or not to think."
> Earlier in this post, I said choosing not to use the mind is immoral,
> because that is the tool we have for survival. What is moral to animals is
> to do whatever they can to promote their lives. For a person to live
> morally, he should use the tools he has to promote his life. Primarily his
> mind. This is where life affirming comes in. Using your mind in a life
> affirming way is moral, not using it in a life affirming way is immoral, but
> we've been there.
Maybe this is something we've been missing: are you saying that life-affirming
is the sole factor in morality? There are inherent problems if it is... go back
to the 'theft without consequence' example... completely irrelevant with
respect to life, but goes against the concept of rights... Is there some other
factor in morality other than life-affirming (like a concept of rights) that
can account for this? Or does life-affirming encompass things like rights? If
so, how would you re-define life-affirming? Anyway, again, expound.
laterz,
Dave
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